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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE WINTERS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES ANTHONY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15523 
This is an action to recover the value of jewelry bailed 
to the Defendant-Appellant for the purpose of reworking the 
jewelry into a different piece. The reconstructed piece was 
subsequently either lost or stolen and remains undelivered to 
the Plaintiff-Respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried on the 29th day of September, 1977, 
before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, sitting without a 
jury. On the 19th day of October, 1977, judgment was awarded 
in favor of Respondent in the amount of eight thousand one 
hundred and eighty dollars ($8,180.00), together with all court 
costs and interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) from May 
25, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a remittitur of the damages assessed by 
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the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 23rd of March, 1976, Respondent took a gold 
bracelet set with sixty-three green stones and fifty-four 
half pearls to Appellant's place of business at Trolley 
Square in order to have it converted into a cross to be 
worn as a pendant or pin. The bracelet was a gift received 
by Respondent around July of 1970 from Respondent's brother-
in-law. The alterations were completed by Appellant around 
April 15, 1976. 
On the 12th of May, 1976, Respondent tendered one hundred 
dollars ($100.00) as a partial payment for the work done; 
the total cost of the remanufacture was one hundred twenty-six 
dollars ($126.00). Subsequently, Appellant delivered the 
pendant cross to a Mr. H. J. Vanderveer for appraisal. 
Vanderveer had seen the item prior to its reconstruction. 
Vanderveer determined that the green stones were emeralds; 
he then assigned a value to them, the half pearls, and the 
piece in toto. 
On the 14th day of June, 1976, Respondent returned to 
Appellant's place of business to pick up the completed item. 
She was informed by an employee of Appellant that the pendant 
was missing; the pendant has never been relocated. Whereupon, 
Respondent commenced an action for the value of said pendant 
in Third District Court. 
Respondent brought a motion for Summary Judgment which 
-2-
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was denied by the court and the matter proceeded to trial. 
Conflicting testimony concerninq the value of the lost pendant 
was given by Barry Nash, an employee of Appellant, and H. J. 
Vanderveer. The tri~l court adopted as the measure of 
damages the appraisal value of the pendant as determined by 
H. J. Vanderveer, stating in its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law #3: 
That the market value, the replacement 
cost to the Plaintiff, and appraisal 
value of the cross were the same. 
The only matter that now concerns the Court is the 
appropriate valuation of the damaqes suffered by the Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE APPRAISAL 
VALUE AS THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
In its Findinqs of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial 
court determined that the appraisal value was the figure of 
recovery for the Respondent, concludinq that the market value 
and replacement costs of the pendant were equal to that of 
the appraised value. In arriving at this determination, 
the court committed error in that it failed to utilize the 
appropriate measure of damages. 
The appropriate measure of damages is market value, 
which is the same as replacement cost. 
8 Arn. Jur. 2d, Bailments §332 states that where bailed 
goods are lost or destroyed, the measure of damages is the 
value of the property at time and place of loss. §333 of the 
-3-
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same work states: "The value of the property for purposes 
of ascertainment of the damages is ordinarily determined 0 
reference to its fair market value ... " As a matter of law, 
market value is to be determined by sales in the ordinary 
course of business. Herein, sales in the ordinary course 
of business reflect the Salt Lake City retail jewelry tra~. 
In Clack-Nomah Flying Club v. Sterling Aircraft, Inc., 
17 Ut. 2d 245, 408 P2d 904 (1965), a case involving the 
destruction of an airplane by a windstorm while in the 
custody of a bailee, this Court stated: 
This Court has consistently held that 
a bailee for hire is respon~ ble for 
the value of goods entrustec to him 
which he fails to return ... 408 P2d 904 (1965) 
The Court went on to hold the bailee liable for the 
value of the unreturned aircraft. The Clack-Nomah decision 
did not discuss how it arrived at the value of the aircraft. 
However, the means by which value for personal property 
that is lost or destroyed is determined was settled by 
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 P2d 914 (1952). 
The Park case involved a breach of warranty, the warranty 
arising when defendant's agents promised that a certain 
chicken feed would be of great benefit to plaintiff's egg-
laying chickens when, in fact, it ultimately killed them. 
The Court upheld an instruction to the jury which read: 
-4-
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... plaintiff is entitled to 
compensation for an amount 
that will correspond to the 
market value of the chickens 
which died ... 
241 P2d 914, 921 (1952) 
The Court has thus upheld language consistent with the 
general measure of damages as referred to in 8 AM JUR 2d 
Bailments, supra. 
The Park decision contains language which serves as a 
guide in all damage claims: 
The fundamental principle of damages 
is to restore the injured to the 
position he would have been in had 
it not been for the wrong of the 
other party. 
241 P2d 914, 920 (1952) 
In determining the method by which a party could be 
restored to his pre-injury condition, the Court determined: 
... that where property is destroyed, 
the true measure of damages is the 
difference between the market value 
of that property immediately before 
the destruction and its replacement 
value. 
241 P2d 914, 921 (1952) 
Application of the replacement cost as the market 
value, as Park suggested, found realization in U. s. v. 
Hatahley, 257 F2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958); therein several 
Navajo Indians sued the United States under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (28 USCA 1346(b) and 2671 et. seq.) for 
damages when a number of horses and burros were seized 
and destroyed in Utah by the United States Bureau of 
Land Management. The trial court set damages at $100,000.00; 
the case eventually reached the United States Supreme 
-5-
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Court (Hatahley v. U.S. 351 U.S. 173 (1956)) where a 
remand was ordered to the District Court on the damages 
issue. The case again reached the Tenth Circuit. There 
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., Supra. was quoted (re the 
fundamental principle of damages) and the Court of Appeals 
held: 
... applying this rule, the plaintiffs 
were entitled to the market cost, or 
replacement cost of their horses and 
burros as of the time of taking ..• 
257 F2d 920, 923 (emphasis added) 
Hertz Lease Plan, Inc. v. Urban Transportation and 
Planning Assoc., Inc., 342 So2d 886 (La. App. 1977), was 
a recent case which also opted for damages based upon 
replacement costs. In that case, the defendant leased two 
office calculators from the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued 
for default upon the lease. The Louisiana appellate court 
held, inter alia, that the lessor was entitled to recover 
the replacement value of one calculator lost by the lessee. 
A court should, in arriving at a fair market value, consider 
the availability and price of like items; this the trial court 
failed to do herein. 
In restoring Respondent to the position she would have 
been in had it not been for Appellant's wrong, the correct 
measure is the market value of the lost pendant cross. 
Utah law, as held by this Court in Park v. Moorman 
Mfg. Co., Supra, finds replacement value to be determinative 
factor for lost or destroyed personality. 
Mr. Nash on page 36 of the trial transcript (T. 36) 
-6-
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-testified that, "I feel we could compose a piece (identical 
to the lost pendant) for somewhere between 3- and $4,000." 
Mr. Nash further testified that a similar item in Salt Lake 
City would retail at around five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) 
(T. 38). This figure represents the true market value in 
the Salt Lake City retail market, the market that is deter-
minative as to recovery. This figure is considerably less 
than the $8,180.00 amount of damages assigned by the trial 
court through application of an inappropriate standard; it 
is $3,180 to $4,180 less. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE APPRAISAL 
VALUE WAS EQUAL TO MARKET VALUE BECAUSE IN THE SALT LAKE CITY 
RETAIL MARKET, THE PENDANT COULD NOT HAVE COMMANDED THE 
APPRAISAL VALUE. 
As noted above, the replacement cost of the pendant, 
upon which suit is brought, would be significantly less than 
the appraised value. This also reflects the difference 
between the true market value of the pendant and the appraised 
value. In Utah, 
As a general rule, market value is the 
highest price a purchaser is willing to 
pay for property, not being under compul-
sion to buy, and the lowest price a seller 
is willing to accept, not being under 
compulsion to sell. Northern Oil Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 353, 140 P2d 
329 (1943) 
In the Salt Lake City retail jewelry market, the market 
which is determinative in this case, Mr. Nash testified, "I 
would expect realistically, the high retail figure (of the 
pendant) would not be more than five." ($5,000.00 - emphasis 
-7-
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added). Utilizing that figure ($5,000) in the market 
value determination as set out in Northern Oil Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, Supra., it appears that the trial 
court granted an award that was excessive by at least 
$3,180. 
Recovery must be limited to the Salt Lake City retail 
jewelry market. In Watts v. Nevada Central R. Co., 23 Nev. 
154, 44P. 423 (1894), a plaintiff was damaged by the 
destruction of hay he had stored with a railroad when 
a severe winter struck and his stock died without the 
hay. The court did not permit recovery on the basis of 
inflated winter prices, " ... but its fair cash market value 
if sold in the market under ordinary circumstances ... " 
44 P. 423 (1894) (emphasis added) Herein, as Mr. Nash 
testified, under ordinary circumstances a pendant like the 
one lost could not command a price in the Salt Lake City 
retail jewelry market of more than $5,000.00 
Mr. Nash's estimate concerning the retail cost of 
the pendant reflects his familiarity with the piece of 
jewelry and his six years of experience in retail jewelry; 
he is cognizant of a critical factor which H. J. Vanderveer, 
the appraiser, was not: that a piece of jewelry having 
value over a few thousand dollars is not subject to 
"keystoning." Keystoninq was explained by Mr. Vanderveer 
at the trial as a doubling of the wholesale price by the 
jeweler to arrive at a retail figure (T 13-14). Mr. Nash 
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testified that " ... When you have an item (that) costs more 
than a couple of thousand dollars, retail, a jeweler will 
not keystone - he will not double his price to arrive at 
(a) retail figure." (T29-30). 
Mr. Vanderveer explained that he doubled the wholesale 
value of the emeralds and pearls to arrive at what he 
believed to be the retail value (T 12). 
The evidence indicates the Salt Lake City retail jewelry 
market and replacement cost of Respondent's lost pendant 
represents a figure several thousand dollars less than the 
award granted by the trial court, i.e., $3,000 - $4,000 
less. 
The case of Stoll v. Almon C. Judd, 106 Conn. 551, 138 A. 
479 (1927), was a situation in which the plaintiff, a jobber 
who purchased jewelry from manufacturers and sold to retail 
outlets, left his jewelry cases, for safekeeping, with an 
employee of defendant's hotel. The cases were then apparently 
stolen. The trial court awarded judgment for the plaintiff, 
from which the defendant appealed. The trial court had 
charged that the plaintiff could recover: 
•.. the value in the market open to 
the plaintiff at the time of loss. 
138 A. 479, 483 (emphasis added) 
The defendant complained that this instruction was deficient 
because the jury was not instructed that the market value 
referred to should be the wholesale market. 
The appellate court found, however, that the jury had 
-9-
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applied the standard forwarded by the defendant, the jury's 
award reflecting the wholesale value of the lost jewelry 
and bags. The court stated: 
Market value means, generally, the 
price for which an article is bought 
and sold, and is ordinarily best 
established by sales in the ordinary 
course of business •.. · 
138 A 479, 483 (emphasis added) 
Sales of an item, such as the lost pendant in this 
case, in the ordinary course of business would be based 
on a figure of around $5,000.00, as testified to by Mr. 
Nash. Therefore, in the market open to Respondent in the 
ordinary course of business, a replacement would cost not 
more than $5,000 retail. 
The case of Lipschutz v. Gordon Jewelry, 373 F. Supp. 
375 (S.D. Tex. 1974) involved an action brought to recover 
damages resulting from the loss of diamonds sent by a dealer ' 
to a jeweler. The "stated value" of the shipment was $273,55i 
The defendants argued that the plaintiff had to show the 
actual damages suffered rather than merely relying on this 
stated value. The court rejected this argument, finding 
that the "asking price" is the accepted measure of damages 
in the diamond industry. Herein, the "asking price" that a 
Salt Lake retail jeweler would seek, as testified to by Mr. 
Nash, is a figure several thousand dollars less than the 
award granted by the trial court. This "asking price" would 
1 
be the amount in "the market open to the plaintiff." Again, 
in Salt Lake City, the market figure for a similar pendant 
-10- I 
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open to the plaintiff would be around $5,000.00. This 
figure should then represent the limits of Respondent's 
recovery. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE APPRAISER'S 
TESTIMONY ON THE MARKET VALUE OF THE JEWELRY. 
Counsel for Appellant objected at the trial to the fact 
that Mr. VanderVeer's testimony on the retail value of the 
jewelry was given without proper foundation being provided 
regarding VanderVeer's expertise in the Salt Lake City retail 
jewelry market (T 13). Nevertheless, the court received Vander-
Veer's testimony concerning the retail value of the pendant. 
By receiving such testimony, the court committed error. 
Vanderveer was not competent to testify as an expert witness 
regarding the retail prices of jewelry. Mr. Vanderveer dealt 
in the jewelry market as an occasional dealer and appraiser 
at the wholesale level, but he admitted he had no experience 
at the retail market level. 
When this is considered with VanderVeer's incorrect 
assumption regarding the retail practice of "keystoning", or 
doubling of wholesale, it is clear that Vanderveer was not 
competent to testify as an expert on the retail value of 
jewelry in the Salt Lake City retail market. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Arnold, 218 Ore. 
43, 341 P2d 1089 (1956), a case concerning valuation of a 
state condemned leasehold in surface and mineral rights, 
stated: 
-11-
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We have held that an expert cannot 
give an opinion unless the facts 
upon which his opinion is based 
are disclosed by his or other 
witness' testimony. P2d 1089, 1101 
The facts upon which Vanderveer based his appraisal 
reflect incorrect assumptions and a lack of expertise in 
the area of retail sales of jewelry. Such lack of knowledge 
concerning the retail market renders VanderVeer's testimony 
unpersuasive and incompetent on the subject of value of t~ 
pendant cross. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES THAT CREATE 
A WINDFALL FOR THE RESPONDENT. 
The preceeding pages indicate that any recovery over 
the retail market-replacement value is excessive, because 
such additional recovery would result in windfall profits ~ 
respondent. Respondent did not tender payment for the je~~: 
at a price greater than the retail market-replacement value; 
in fact, the jewelry in its original state, a bracelet, was 
a gift to her. In Stoll v. Almon C. Judd, Supra. , the Court 
declined to award the plaintiff the retail value of the lost 
property, determining that a recovery on that figure would 
amount to windfall profits. 
Herein if the Respondent should be permitted to recover 
the amount of damages assigned by the trial court, she would 
receive a windfall in excess of $3,000.00 The evidence 
clearly supports a recovery of $5,000.00 or less. 
-12-
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Damages have frequently been reduced where the figure 
set by the trial court was determined to be excessive. I~ 
is definite as a matter of law that the $8,180 figure set 
out by the trial court in this case is disproportionate to 
any reasonable limit of compensation due to the fact that: 
1) the trial court utilized the wrong measure of damages, and 
2) the market value-replacement cost is significantly lower 
than the appraisal value. It can be said that neither the 
evidence nor the rules of law support a damage recovery in 
the amount declared by the trial court. This means, as the 
court in Farris v. Clark, 158 Mont. 33, 487 P.2d 1307 (1971), 
held, inter alia, that it was error to award the plaintiff 
with a sum that was inconsistent with the proof of loss and 
that the award should have been limited to the market value 
of the car that was damaged in the accident, plus towage and 
storage. 
Here the proof of loss and retail market value point to 
a figure of approximately $5,000 for the lost pendant. 
Additional recovery creates a windfall for the Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in applying the measure of 
damages and failed to recognize that the appraisal value 
is not the same as the market value in the Salt Lake City 
retail jewelry trade. The evidence and rules of law indicate 
that the recovery determined by the trial court is excessive. 
For the foregoing reasons, the damage award of the 
-13-
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trial court should be remitted to the appropriate amount. 
Respectfully submitted this c;.lf of February, 1978. 
LANDERMAN & RODGERS 
By~e~ 
Richard C. Landerman 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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